Annotations (27)
“They sit down with the manager who has to put together this monthly report, which has to be done every month. What they do is open up a clean Excel doc, pull sources from five different areas, populate it, and put it together. It takes 10 hours. By building various AI-powered tools to pull in data and put it together, what was taking 10 hours is now less than an hour, even with checking, and is delivered in a much better, more thorough, customized, and standardized way.”— Peter Lacaillade
The New Breed of AI-Powered Venture Firms · p. 16
Technology & Engineering · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
10 hours to 1 hour via workflow automation
“To do it right, you need significant capital and a substantial, not too large, team with skill sets in both finance and AI engineering. Long Lake, for reference, is a holding company founded a couple of years ago by Alex Taubman, who had been at Oaktree, and Zack Frankel, who was co-founder of Ramp and co-founder of Cognition. You look at what they're doing.”— Peter Lacaillade
The New Breed of AI-Powered Venture Firms · p. 15
Technology & Engineering · Business & Entrepreneurship · Operations & Execution
DUR_CONTEXTUAL
Finance plus engineering skill, not too big
“One thing I really do, and continue, is make sure we are trying to find contrary views or people who are not doing the fund. I don't even do many on-list reference calls. I'm generally just assuming they're all good and focusing on going off-list. But it's also really important that you have very trusted relationships with people on the other side of the phone. There's an example I can think of recently with a fund we passed on. I know one of my good friends works at that firm, and I called him.”— Peter Lacaillade
Managing Risk in Private Equity · p. 7
Strategy & Decision Making · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_ENDURING
Skip on-list calls; hunt for contrary views
“Lower middle market varies depending on the business model, industry dynamics, growth, et cetera. But say a typical small business will trade for five to six times EBITDA. On the low end, maybe if it's a really great business with high growth, it's five to eight times EBITDA. Whereas when you scale that, taking it from somewhere in the 2 to 7 million of EBITDA up to 20-plus, that is valued by the market somewhere between 12 to 16 or 18 times.”— Peter Lacaillade
The Changing Landscape of Asset Management · p. 11
Business & Entrepreneurship · Economics & Markets · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Multiple expansion from 5x to 15x via professionalization
“What we strive for in our program is top quartile returns, which typically means an additional 5% plus on top of the 3 to 5% that you expect over public equities. We target high-teens to low-20s IRRs. We put in our book 16 to 18% net IRR and multiples around 2.5x. One thing I saw when I worked at HarbourVest Partners: there was a lot of enthusiasm around large-cap buyouts leading up to 2007.”— Peter Lacaillade
Institutional Scale Wealth Management · p. 5
Business & Entrepreneurship · Psychology & Behavior · Economics & Markets
DUR_ENDURING
Missing best vintages by following crowd
“Some of our greatest deals have been very operationally focused. These teams carve out a division, take on a ton of complexity, and succeed. What's really hard is generating alpha doing consensus trades. By the way, those can still make money. There are friends of yours in Greenwich who will be very successful financially by buying businesses that lower middle-market firms professionalized, generating somewhere between a 2x and 2.5x gross and maybe high teens net.”— Peter Lacaillade
Traits of Top Managers · p. 14
Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Need buyers willing to pay 15x for what you built at 7x
“The approach that Greenoaks takes is the opposite of the typical model. Usually, people hire more, delegate more, and cover more of the waterfront. Greenoaks has shifted to having Neil at the tip of the spear for almost all first meetings. Short of having himself, his wife, or his kid in surgery, he'll be there for that first meeting, prepared, adding value, and ready to negotiate a deal on the spot if needed.”— Peter Lacaillade
The New Players in Early-Stage Deals · p. 19
Leadership & Management · Strategy & Decision Making · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Scale by doing less, not hiring more
“Generally, I think it's pretty crappy. The banks like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, they're great firms; they can do nice things on the lending side. But in general, I think you get real adverse selection doing private investments through those platforms because they have fee arrangements with these firms, and they will only put a firm on the platform if there's some fee share. The best funds are heavily oversubscribed and don't take wealth management dollars.”— Peter Lacaillade
Why the Industry Needs a Reality Check · p. 8
Business & Entrepreneurship · Economics & Markets · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Banks show what they're paid to show
“I think you run the risk that a lot of people are going to have pretty mediocre experiences in private equity because a lot of the products that are being put together to cater to the high-net-worth or even mass affluent market are done by really large-cap shops in vehicles that have lower cost of capital. The bids from the sophisticated buyers for these assets came in at mid-80s pricing.”— Peter Lacaillade
Managing Risk in Private Equity · p. 6
Economics & Markets · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Forced deployment destroys returns
“It was the summer of 2012. I'd been basically a year on the job. Josh Kushner was bringing in SCS and Rothschild as the two LPs. One of our families, through an idiosyncratic thing, got angry. It was two-thirds of the commitment we were going to make. They backed out really last minute. I remember talking with Jared Weinstein, and he said, 'This is pretty baked.”— Peter Lacaillade
The Power of Support · p. 28
Leadership & Management · Business & Entrepreneurship · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_ENDURING
Partners asked how to solve, not why
“We use pooled vehicles that we set up every two years. We get the money from our clients and then allocate across a series of different funds and co-investments. You don't want to do it every year; you want to do it every two years. But you also don't want to do it every three to four years. Every two years, you get the right mix of underlying buyout, growth, venture funds, and co-investments. The venture funds often raise in two-year cycles, so it's nice.”— Peter Lacaillade
Institutional Scale Wealth Management · p. 4
Business & Entrepreneurship · Strategy & Decision Making · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Two-year cycle matches fund raising cadence
“My advice to GPs: really focus on a smaller number of higher-quality meetings, not doing a spray shot across a hundred different LPs globally, but to be deliberate about picking the 10 to 25 you want to talk to, with a 30 to 60% hit rate. You have to understand: what is this LP's capital situation? What are they looking for right now?”— Peter Lacaillade
Who Peter Would Invest With · p. 24
Strategy & Decision Making · Business & Entrepreneurship
DUR_ENDURING
Target 10-25 LPs with 30-60% conversion
“One thing that worries me is the game that the biggest players, Andreessen, Lightspeed, GC, are playing. Doing $10 million on $50 million post-money might make sense for them. But maybe the company only needed to raise $3 to 4 million; they could have done $4 million on $20 million instead. That can be bad for the company and probably bad for the seed-stage firms that don't have enough money to play. So not everyone's aligned. They're playing different games.”— Peter Lacaillade
The New Players in Early-Stage Deals · p. 19
Economics & Markets · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Too much capital harms company and ecosystem
“We basically carved out about a third of our venture budget to invest in these emerging solo capitalists. You had very credible people deciding not to join firms, but instead be their own kind of firm and still get access to the best companies. Often they were introduced through Thrive, which has been the most prolific introduction source for us. But Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, and connectivity around our network also played a role.”— Peter Lacaillade
The New Players in Early-Stage Deals · p. 19
Business & Entrepreneurship · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_CONTEXTUAL
One-third allocation to solo capitalists
“Shore Capital is the exception. Justin and his team have been incredible to watch in their evolution. They started off doing microcap healthcare buyouts and have been very disciplined in keeping the microcap healthcare side small. The returns for Shore are exceptional, but what they've also done is deliver really high-quality businesses to their sellers, which is not something you can say for every healthcare roll-up.”— Peter Lacaillade
Who Peter Would Invest With · p. 25
Business & Entrepreneurship · Strategy & Decision Making · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Expand but keep core small and excellent
“Thrive was very clear: stage-agnostic, industry-agnostic. They didn't want to be put in a box. Some people say too much in their fundraise early on and box themselves in. Josh did the opposite. He was very open. They've continued to evolve and have emerged as one of the most important growth investors in the world. Right now, with their holding company, they're doing buyouts, using AI to enhance fragmented industries.”— Peter Lacaillade
The New Breed of AI-Powered Venture Firms · p. 15
Strategy & Decision Making · Business & Entrepreneurship
DUR_ENDURING
Avoid boxing yourself in early
“There's this guy we're backing right now, Jordan Dubin, who hasn't even graduated yet from HBS. Over the two years he's been there, with two of his former partners at L Catterton, they have done a garage door company, Guild Garage Door. It is well north of 30, maybe north of 40 million in EBITDA. Just run through walls, going to work harder than anyone. He was an athlete. He doesn't have a chip on his shoulder; I think he has a boulder on his shoulder.”— Peter Lacaillade
Traits of Top Managers · p. 12
Business & Entrepreneurship · Psychology & Behavior · Leadership & Management
DUR_ENDURING
Boulder on shoulder, not chip
“I remember a bunch of companies back when I was first starting SCS in 2011 through 2014. They would have websites saying they did real estate online, but all it was was a shiny website with no substance, just trying to make the user experience look cool. It's like having A-plus teams go extremely deep and build something specifically to solve a problem versus just selling a product.”— Peter Lacaillade
The New Breed of AI-Powered Venture Firms · p. 16
Technology & Engineering · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Shiny UI not substance; go five layers deep
“We're flexible in our mindset. A lot of our capital invests out of a 12-year vehicle with three-year extensions. We need some understanding around exit rights toward the end of the fund's life. In reality, if Long Lake is successful, they will likely take it public. They're like a private equity firm in some ways, but with a substantive technology story. Instead of trading at a teens multiple, it could trade north of that because of the AI story and the different areas it can enter.”— Peter Lacaillade
Comparing Different Fund Structures · p. 17
Business & Entrepreneurship · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Holding company IPO creates earlier optionality
“You're getting into a partnership that usually is 10 years plus three years, and then there could be extensions beyond that. Often these things are lasting 15-plus years, which I think is longer than the average marriage. You really need to know the character of the partner that you're investing in, and understand that they're going to be good partners in good times and bad.”— Peter Lacaillade
Managing Risk in Private Equity · p. 7
Leadership & Management · Business & Entrepreneurship · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_ENDURING
Character over capability in 15-year partnerships
Frameworks (3)
Two-Year Pooled Vehicle Structure
Creating Institutional-Grade Access for Wealth Management
A structural innovation that enables wealth management platforms to compete with endowments and institutions for access to top-tier private equity managers by pooling client capital into vehicles raised every two years, matching the fundraising cadence of venture and growth funds while providing flexibility for client-level adjustments.
Components
- Establish Two-Year Cadence
- Model Client Allocations
- Maintain Flexibility
- Aggregate to Institutional Scale
Prerequisites
- Minimum $5 billion AUM to be relevant
- Stable, growing capital base
- Experienced investment team
Success Indicators
- Oversubscribed fund allocations
- Top-quartile manager access
- Growing client NAV targets
Failure Modes
- Subscale ticket sizes leading to adverse selection
- Client withdrawals disrupting commitments
- Poor manager selection negating structure benefits
Off-List Reference Call Method
Systematic Search for Contrary Evidence
A due diligence framework that deliberately avoids on-list reference calls in favor of seeking contrary views from trusted sources who are NOT invested in the fund, specifically targeting people with insider knowledge who can reveal disqualifying information.
Components
- Skip the Echo Chamber
- Identify Contrary Sources
- Build Trust Networks
Prerequisites
- Reputation for confidentiality
- Existing network in the industry
- Willingness to walk away from deals
Success Indicators
- Discovering disqualifying information before investing
- Avoiding blow-ups that peers experience
- Sources proactively reaching out with warnings
Failure Modes
- Not having trusted sources
- Ignoring contrary evidence when you find it
- Breaking confidences and losing trust
Focused Fundraising Strategy
High-Conversion Targeted Approach
A fundraising methodology for GPs that prioritizes a small number of high-quality LP relationships over spray-and-pray approaches, targeting 10-25 LPs with 30-60% conversion rates by understanding their capital situations and avoiding excessive road time that distracts from investing.
Components
- Select Target LPs
- Get Warm Introductions
- Time-Box the Raise
Prerequisites
- Strong network or placement agent
- Clear articulation of strategy
- Understanding of LP capital cycles
Success Indicators
- 30-60% conversion on target LPs
- Minimal time away from investing
- Long-term LP relationships established
Failure Modes
- Spray-and-pray approach with low conversion
- Excessive time on the road
- Taking money from wrong LPs
Mental Models (3)
Forced Deployment Destroys Returns
EconomicsWhen capital has to be deployed to avoid cash drag, it bids up prices and accepts worse terms, destroying returns. Evergreen funds and interval funds systematically overbid sophisticated buyers because they NEED to put money to work, not because the opportunity is attractive.
In Practice: Lacaillade describing 10% spread between sophisticated buyers (mid-80s) and evergreen interval funds (mid-90s) on secondary deals
Demonstrated by Leg-pl-001
Herd Behavior in Market Cycles
PsychologyThe tendency for investors to follow the crowd into overheated markets and pause during downturns.
In Practice: Lacaillade describing how wealth management clients loaded up on 2005-2007 large-cap buyouts
Demonstrated by Leg-pl-001
Inversion via Seeking Disconfirming Evidence
Decision MakingThe deliberate search for reasons NOT to do something, particularly by seeking contrary views from people who passed on an opportunity or who have insider knowledge of failure modes. This inverts the confirmation bias of on-list reference calls.
In Practice: Lacaillade describing his practice of skipping on-list calls and hunting for contrary views, including the example of a friend saying 'don't walk, run' away from a fund
Demonstrated by Leg-pl-001
Key Figures (7)
Josh Kushner
5 mentionsFounder, Thrive Capital
Justin Ishbia
3 mentionsFounder, Shore Capital Partners
Neil Mehta
2 mentionsFounder, Greenoaks Capital
Frank Chen
2 mentionsCo-CEO, ZBS Partners
Zack Frankel
1 mentionsCo-Founder, Long Lake Capital (Ramp, Cognition Co-Founder)
Alex Taubman
1 mentionsCo-Founder, Long Lake Capital (Oaktree Background)
Jordan Dubin
1 mentionsFounder, Independent Sponsor (Garage Door Roll-up)
Harvard Business School student who built a garage door roll-up company to $30-40 million EBITDA before graduating, backed by SCS. Described as having 'a boulder on his shoulder' rather than a chip, exemplifying extreme work ethic and intensity.
- He doesn't have a chip on his shoulder; he has a boulder on his shoulder.
Key People (6)
Jordan Dubin
HBS student building garage door roll-up to $40M EBITDA
Josh Kushner
Founder of Thrive Capital
Alex Taubman
Co-founder Long Lake Capital
Zack Frankel
Co-founder Long Lake, Ramp, Cognition
Neil Mehta
Founder Greenoaks Capital
Justin Ishbia
Founder Shore Capital Partners
Concepts (4)
Vintage Year
CL_FINANCIALThe year a private equity fund makes its first investment, determining exposure to market conditions.
Evergreen Fund
CL_FINANCIALA fund with no fixed end date that continuously raises and deploys capital.
Adverse Selection
CL_ECONOMICSMarket condition where lower-quality options are systematically chosen due to information asymmetry.
EBITDA Multiple
CL_FINANCIALEnterprise value divided by EBITDA.
Synthesis
Synthesis
Migrated from Scholia