Annotations (11)
“If you go back to 1929 and the parallel to 2008 is actually apt, people weren't selling their stocks out of panic or fear. They were selling because they had taken out too much money and were at too much leverage. When stocks fell by November 13th, 1929, by 50% from their high, it wasn't just that the equity value had dropped by 50%. They were levered 10 to 1 and the bank had called them and said, excuse me, you need to pay us.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
Economics & Markets · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_ENDURING
Leverage transforms price drops into forced selling spirals
“The Glass-Steagall bill was not as pure as most people thought. It was not that Carter Glass had decided this bill would look like the bill that was put in place in 1933. The bill was as corrupted as ever. Parts of the bill were ultimately written by effectively a member of the Rockefeller family who owned Chase, and it was done in large part to just shiv J.P. Morgan, its competitor.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
History & Geopolitics · Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets
DUR_ENDURING
Rockefeller wrote Glass-Steagall to attack Morgan
“In the spring of 1929, the Fed knew that speculation was getting out of control. They desperately wanted to tamp it down. There's a battle about whether to raise interest rates and by how much. But the view was that they would have to raise them so much that they were almost convinced themselves that to really tamp speculation down, you'd have to raise interest rates so much that you by default would tip the economy, and they didn't have the courage to do that.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
Economics & Markets · Psychology & Behavior · History & Geopolitics
DUR_ENDURING
Fed knew what to do, lacked courage to do it
“John Raskob got involved in politics. He was a Republican turned Democrat. He spent an extraordinary amount of money to secretly try to undermine the reputation of Hoover. I actually think that part of the reason that Hoover's reputation is so dim even today is a result of this very influential, wealthy individual who spent 2 years paying off journalists and running this secret campaign.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
History & Geopolitics · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Raskob paid journalists to destroy Hoover's reputation
“Carter Glass and Hoover, and even Roosevelt, did not want to implement the FDIC. This idea of deposit insurance was super unpopular, both Republican and Democrats, because they believed that it would effectively allow banks to almost become too big to fail, that you would basically be supporting everybody. Those that were weaker were going to have the same kind of support that the strong banks had.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
Economics & Markets · History & Geopolitics · Philosophy & Reasoning
DUR_ENDURING
Deposit insurance opposed for creating moral hazard
“Prior to 1920, 1919, it was a moral sin for many Americans to take on debt. People didn't do that. You were sort of the dregs of the universe if you were a debt holder. That really shifted in 1919 when John Raskob, who was running General Motors, wanted more people to buy cars. He said, how are we going to get people to buy more cars? We're going to lend them the money to buy the cars. That really shifted the mindset around debt.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
Culture & Society · Economics & Markets · Business & Entrepreneurship
DUR_ENDURING
Consumer debt created to sell cars, not vice versa
“There are two issues in a crisis: can you prevent the crisis on the front end, and what do you do once you're in a crisis on the back end? Not only did they not choose to try to do something to prevent it demonstrably on the front end, but on the back end, when there was a debate about could you lower interest rates, flood the system with money, for the most part they sat on their hands.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
Economics & Markets · History & Geopolitics
DUR_ENDURING
Crisis management: prevent before, act decisively after
“John Raskob was the Elon Musk of his time. Somebody who ran General Motors, became a super influential investor, a philosopher king that everybody listened to at every given moment. He constructs the Empire State Building, probably the equivalent of SpaceX at that time. He had written a paper about creating a 5-day work week in November 1929, not because he wanted people to work less and be nice to them, but because he thought there was an economic argument that if people didn't have to work on...”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
Business & Entrepreneurship · Economics & Markets · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Weekend created to increase consumer spending
“In 1928, there's an article with the headline 'Our Second Billionaire.' That was the title. And it was Henry Ford. Our first billionaire was Rockefeller. These are of course not inflation adjusted figures, these were real. The actual leaders, whether it was John Raskob or Mitchell, were not that philanthropic, in part because they were new money in the 1920s. It was sort of a new thing, and they were not philanthropic yet. Then the crash happened and most of them frankly lost it all.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
History & Geopolitics · Economics & Markets
DUR_ENDURING
New money vanished before philanthropy could begin
“People walking into brokerage houses all over the country, which had sprung up like Starbucks on the corners, you'd give them a dollar and they'd give you $10. I always wondered, had somebody just stood up and said, we're not doing that anymore, 2 to 1, 3 to 1, we're good with that. After that, this is not allowed. There are things, by the way Carter Glass was trying to impose a tax on trades.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
Economics & Markets · History & Geopolitics
DUR_CONTEXTUAL
10:1 margin ubiquitous; simple caps might have helped
“In 1929, when people lost money, for the most part, at least initially, they blamed themselves. There actually was personal accountability. Groucho Marx famously lost his home. He had to mortgage his home because of margin loans. While he blamed the broker to some degree for suggesting he buy some of these stocks, he ultimately blamed himself, which is a very different approach to life than we have today, where there's always finger-pointing. It's never our own fault.”— Andrew Ross Sorkin
Culture & Society · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_CONTEXTUAL
1929: investors blamed themselves, not system
Mental Models (13)
Leverage Cascade
EconomicsWhen assets are purchased with borrowed money, price declines trigger forced liquidation which drives prices lower, triggering more forced liquidation.
In Practice: Why 1929 crash accelerated so quickly
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Forced Liquidation Spiral
Systems ThinkingA self-reinforcing negative feedback loop where selling begets more selling. The
In Practice: Mechanism behind 1929 crash severity
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Fortune Before Philanthropy Window
TimeNew fortunes are vulnerable to destruction before they can be deployed to enduri
In Practice: Sorkin on why 1920s new money never became philanthropic
Demonstrated by Leg-hf-001
Moral Hazard
EconomicsWhen protection from loss changes behavior, increasing the likelihood of loss.
In Practice: Why Roosevelt and Hoover opposed FDIC initially
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Policy Tradeoff Visibility
Decision MakingEvery policy choice creates winners and losers, but which costs are visible versus hidden determines political feasibility.
In Practice: Debate over deposit insurance costs
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Regulatory Capture Through Drafting
Strategic ThinkingThe most effective way to shape regulation is to write the regulation. Glass-Steagall was drafted pa
In Practice: How Glass-Steagall actually got written
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Competitive Regulation
EconomicsRegulation that appears to be about public interest but actually advantages one competitor over another.
In Practice: True motivation behind Glass-Steagall structure
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Create the Need, Provide the Solution
Strategic ThinkingInstead of finding customers for your product, create conditions where your product becomes necessar
In Practice: How Raskob invented consumer credit to sell cars
Demonstrated by Leg-ac-001
Inadequate Response Paralysis
Decision MakingWhen the correct intervention is large enough to have significant costs, decision-makers often choose inadequate interventions that are guaranteed to fail.
In Practice: Fed's failure to raise rates aggressively in 1929
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Action Bias Through Prior Regret
PsychologyPast actions that drew criticism create bias against similar future actions even when circumstances differ.
In Practice: Why Fed was scarred by 1920-21 experience
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Two-Phase Crisis Management
TimeCrises require different responses at different stages: prevention before and ac
In Practice: Comparing 1929 Fed failure to 2008 Bernanke success
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Leisure Creates Consumption
EconomicsFree time is not lost productivity; it's latent consumption demand.
In Practice: Raskob economic rationale for 5-day work week
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Sustained Narrative Warfare
Strategic ThinkingPublic reputation can be systematically destroyed through sustained media campaigns independent of a
In Practice: How Raskob destroyed Hoover's reputation
Demonstrated by Leg-jdr-001
Connective Tissue (1)
Brokerage houses springing up like Starbucks on corners offering 10:1 margin
Sorkin uses the modern ubiquity of Starbucks to illustrate how brokerage houses proliferated in the 1920s. Just as Starbucks colonized urban corners in the 1990s-2000s creating a new default infrastructure for coffee consumption, brokerage houses became the default infrastructure for speculation. The parallel captures both physical density (every corner) and cultural normalization (what was once exotic became routine). The mechanism: when a new service category achieves saturation density, it normalizes behavior that was previously seen as specialist or exotic. The 10:1 margin offering was the equivalent of the Grande Latte, a standardized product delivered at massive scale.
Sorkin explaining the proliferation of margin lending in the 1920s
Key Figures (8)
John Raskob
5 mentionsGeneral Motors Executive, Empire State Building Developer
Major 1920s business figure.
- Created consumer debt infrastructure to sell cars
Carter Glass
4 mentionsU.S. Senator, Glass-Steagall Act Co-Author
Herbert Hoover
4 mentions31st President of the United States
J.P. Morgan
2 mentionsBanking Dynasty Founder
Ben Bernanke
2 mentionsFederal Reserve Chairman
Groucho Marx
1 mentionsComedian, Investor
Benjamin Strong
1 mentionsFederal Reserve Bank of New York President
Franklin D. Roosevelt
1 mentions32nd President of the United States
Glossary (1)
shiv
ARCHAICTo stab or attack, often metaphorically meaning to undermine or betray
“Parts of the bill were written to just shiv J.P. Morgan, its competitor”
Key People (8)
Herbert Hoover
(1874–1964)31st U.S. President during 1929 crash
Carter Glass
(1858–1946)Virginia Senator, Glass-Steagall Act co-author
Franklin D. Roosevelt
(1882–1945)32nd U.S. President
Benjamin Strong
(1872–1928)Federal Reserve Bank of New York President, died 1928 before crash
Ben Bernanke
(1953–)Fed Chairman 2006-2014, studied 1929, managed 2008 crisis response
John Raskob
(1879–1950)GM executive, Empire State Building developer
J.P. Morgan
(1837–1913)Banking dynasty founder
Groucho Marx
(1890–1977)Comedian who lost fortune in 1929 crash through margin lending
Concepts (4)
FDIC
CL_FINANCIALFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation, insures bank deposits to prevent runs
margin lending
CL_FINANCIALBorrowing money to buy stocks, using the stocks as collateral for the loan
Glass-Steagall Act
CL_LEGAL1933 law separating investment banking from commercial banking activities
moral hazard
CL_ECONOMICSWhen protection from loss increases risky behavior because consequences are reduced
Synthesis
Synthesis
Migrated from Scholia