Annotations (120)
“The roller at Jones & Laughlin's receives 70 cents per ton. The roller on the 23-inch mill in Homestead receives about 22 or 23 cents per ton. The difference is in favor of Jones & Laughlin's over this 23-inch mill. Jones & Laughlin's mill is a more modern mill, that is, the 18-inch mill, than the Carnegie 23-inch mill, and will do more work a day and easier.”— W. T. Roberts
Testimony of W. T. Roberts · p. 113
Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Low unit labor cost enables downturn survival
“The Carnegie people make the price in the market. You will understand the market price is what these people make it; they make the price in the market. Because they get a monopoly of it almost. The Carnegie people, by making cheaper, undersell the others. When times are dull and all the other mills are idle Carnegie is running. The productive capacities of the mills of the United States at that time were quite limited, and it was protected by the tariff as well as any other article.”— Multiple witnesses
Testimony of W. T. Roberts & John McLuckie · p. 100
Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets · History & Geopolitics
DUR_ENDURING
Regulatory capture undermines wage-price linkage
“Our pay roll at Homestead for the month of May was over $200,000. Only about 40 per cent of that pay roll is affected by the sliding scale or by the price of billets, but we will say it is $80,000. We manufacture at Duquesne about 20,000 tons of billets monthly. Say that we reduce the price of billets at Duquesne $1 per ton in order that it might have an effect upon the wages at Homestead. A reduction of $1 would mean a loss of $20,000 at those works to us.”— H.C. Frick
H.C. Frick Testimony · p. 163
Economics & Markets · Strategy & Decision Making · Philosophy & Reasoning
DUR_ENDURING
Lose $20K to save $3.2K makes no sense
“The minimum was that if the workmen had no minimum in the scales the manufacturers could go out and sell the product upon which wages are based at very low figures and take contracts at that, and what would the final result be? The market would be low, and the manufacturer having a large capacity could go into the market and cut rates, knowing the workmen would have to follow that. That is one of the reasons why the workmen claim they should have a minimum.”— William Weihe
Testimony of William Weihe (continued) · p. 85
Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets · Business & Entrepreneurship
DUR_ENDURING
Without wage floor, employer controls both variables
“The burnt child dreads the fire. We know from past experience that when winter time comes around and our contract ends in the winter, people who have stood just as high in the estimation of the working people of this country have done it: they take that opportunity at that time of the year to starve us into submission. They have done it on every occasion. In the winter time when they throw us idle there is always a class in this country known as snow birds who never work in the summer time.”— W. T. Roberts
Testimony of W. T. Roberts · p. 110
Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets · Leadership & Management
DUR_ENDURING
Contract timing determines which side holds leverage
“Before we arrived there Mr. Potter, the superintendent of the Carnegie Company, was called into the cabin and Capt. Hinde and another Pinkerton officer, and we gave them some instructions that in case of any trouble under no consideration were they to fire their guns unless in self-preservation, and not until some person was wounded or killed of their party. I had letters on my person at that time that cautioned me against any overt act, and I did not propose to order any charge. From Mr.”— John Alfred Potter
Testimony of John Alfred Potter · p. 130
Strategy & Decision Making · Leadership & Management · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Defensive-only ROE preserves narrative advantage
“No member shall be entitled to strike benefits for the first two weeks while on a legalized strike. Payments of benefits shall date from the commencement of the fourth week after the strike has been legalized, and no benefits shall be allowed for the fractional part of the first week.”— Amalgamated Association Constitution
Article VIII, Section 6 · p. 147
Economics & Markets · Psychology & Behavior · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Strike benefit delay forces commitment test
“Now, up there we make sometimes as many as twenty-three to twenty-five heats for a day's work, and other mills, such as the Shoenberger, make four heats for a day's work of twelve hours. The average of the year has been 1,300 tons per month. May was 1,800 tons, showing May as 38% above average, not representative of typical output or earnings.”— George F. Rylands
George F. Rylands Worker Testimony · p. 183
Economics & Markets · Operations & Execution · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_ENDURING
May data 38% above average: cherry-picked
“The sliding scale was based on billets at $26.50 per ton. If the price of billets dropped to $25.50, the wages of the men would be reduced about 3.78 per cent for each decline of $1 per ton in the price of billets down to $25, and after that there was no reduction. The workers' wages tracked market prices up without limit, but had a floor below which they would not fall.”— H. C. Frick
p. 18
Economics & Markets · Leadership & Management · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Wages rise with prices, floor prevents catastrophic cuts
“The sliding scale contract specified that 'the weekly quotations in the market column of the American Manufacturer shall be accepted as the selling prices of billets.' By outsourcing the price determination to a third-party publication, Carnegie created a neutral mechanism that removed subjectivity and reduced negotiation friction over the base number.”
p. 20
Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets · Leadership & Management
DUR_ENDURING
Third-party price reference eliminates pricing disputes
“Carnegie proposed changing the scale termination date from June 30 to December 31. The stated rationale was that manufacturers needed to know wage costs for the full year to make annual contracts. The unstated implication: moving the termination to December ensured that if a strike occurred, it would happen in winter when workers were less able to endure a prolonged work stoppage.”
p. 19
Strategy & Decision Making · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_ENDURING
Winter termination shifted leverage to management
“We desired to have that changed to the 31st of December of each year, for the reason that we desired to know on what to base our calculations for materials which we have to sell for the whole year, and also for the reason that as we are largely engaged at Homestead in the manufacture of beams and material that enters into the construction of fire-proof buildings, July and August and the summer months are the times when the building season is most active, and it is very much against our interest...”— H.C. Frick
Frick Testimony Continued · p. 27
Strategy & Decision Making · Psychology & Behavior · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Winter expiration: low demand weakens worker leverage
“The scale, unless signed in conference, shall be presented to the manufacturers for signature by members of the mill committee representing each department, one week prior to July 1st, the commencement of the scale year, and notice shall be given by them that unless the scale of prices be signed on or before June 30th, all departments of the mill and factory will cease work, except roll turners and engineers.”— Amalgamated Association Constitution
Article XI, Section 10 · p. 150
Strategy & Decision Making · Leadership & Management · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_ENDURING
Seven-day ultimatum forces yes-or-no
“I find that there were 300 men in this department employed in the 119-inch plate mill; 82 were reduced by changes in the tonnage rate. The minimum, however, would apply to the tonnage men on the sliding scale only. Here is a statement of open-hearth department No. 2. There were employed in that department in the month of May 296 men; 196 were unchanged by the new schedule and 100 were changed. Here is a statement of open hearth No.”— H.C. Frick
H.C. Frick Testimony · p. 162
Psychology & Behavior · Leadership & Management · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
325 of 925 reduced: 35% affected, 100% strike
“Only 280 men out of 3,800 total Homestead employees were affected by tonnage rate reductions. Another 45 were affected only by the minimum change, for a total of 325 affected workers, less than 10% of the workforce. The public narrative portrayed this as a workforce-wide wage cut, but 90% of workers saw no change.”
p. 20
Leadership & Management · Strategy & Decision Making · Culture & Society
DUR_ENDURING
10% affected, 100% narrative impact
“At the 119-inch plate mill, tonnage increased 52.3% from 1889 to 1892 due to machinery improvements. Carnegie proposed reducing tonnage rates so that even at the new $23 minimum, worker earnings would match or exceed 1889 levels. A roller earning $9.31/day in 1889 would earn $9.45/day under the new scale at the $26.50 rate, or $8.20/day at the $23 minimum, still 12% below 1889 levels in the worst case.”
p. 20
Operations & Execution · Economics & Markets · Leadership & Management
DUR_ENDURING
Productivity gains justify rate cuts without harming earnings
“When scales of wages were made in 1889 for the 119-inch plate mill it was based on rolling direct from ingots, the tonnage being about 2,500 tons per month. The tonnage on the mill has since been doubled; that is to say, 5,000 tons on account of change in practice, namely, the ingot is now taken to what is known as the 32-inch slabbing mill, where more than half the work is done.”— H.C. Frick
Frick Testimony Continued · p. 29
Operations & Execution · Economics & Markets · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Output doubled via process split, wages didn't adjust
“If you compel either side to do a thing that they do not wish to do, it certainly would not be satisfactory to them. If we are going to have compulsory regulation of wage matters, then the books and everything should be shown to see what the profits are. Otherwise I do not believe it would be proper. All parties should be compelled to show what their profits were so they could reach something that would be satisfactory.”— William Weihe
Testimony of William Weihe (continued) · p. 84
Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets · Philosophy & Reasoning
DUR_ENDURING
Arbitration requires transparency to compel fairness
“Should the executive committee of the district or division, after deciding the brother victimized, deem the organization unable to sustain a strike for his reinstatement, he shall receive from the protective fund of the association six dollars ($6.00) per week, for a period of eight (8) weeks and no longer, unless in extreme cases, when it shall be left discretionary with the president of the national lodge.”— Amalgamated Association Constitution
Article IX, Section 2 · p. 148
Strategy & Decision Making · Economics & Markets · Leadership & Management
DUR_ENDURING
Pay the victim when you cannot win the war
“The reduction in the selling price of our product was one reason; another reason, we had to put in new machinery, which largely increased the output; that is to say, we had to put in this new open-hearth plant to increase our capacity in that direction, in addition to the No. 1 open-hearth plant we had, changing the method of operation there, casting a larger ingot, so that the tonnage would be larger, and by changes made in this 32-inch slabbing mill we have been enabled to increase the product...”— H.C. Frick
H.C. Frick Testimony · p. 163
Economics & Markets · Operations & Execution · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
50% more output justifies lower rate per ton
Frameworks (9)
Sliding-Scale Wage System
Market-indexed compensation with asymmetric floors and ceilings
A systematic approach to linking worker compensation to product market prices through a defined mathematical relationship, with a minimum price floor below which wages do not decline and unlimited upside as prices rise. Reduces negotiation friction by making wages predictable and transparent, while sharing both upside gains and downside protection between employer and workers.
Components
- Select Reference Price
- Define Adjustment Formula
- Set Minimum Floor
- Embed Dispute Resolution
Prerequisites
- Transparent market pricing for reference product
- Historical wage and price data for calibration
- Willingness of both parties to accept price volatility
Success Indicators
- Wage negotiations shift from absolute levels to formula parameters
- Disputes decrease over time as trust in mechanism builds
- Both parties reference published prices without prompting
Failure Modes
- Reference price becomes manipulated or stops being published
- Floor is hit frequently, making upside-only sharing feel unfair to workers
- Formula complexity prevents worker verification
Productivity-Adjusted Piece-Rate System
Maintaining earnings parity when technology changes output per unit of labor
A systematic method for adjusting piece-rate compensation when technological or process improvements dramatically increase output per unit of labor input, while preserving worker earnings at historical levels. The approach uses historical earnings data as the anchor and productivity measurements as the adjustment mechanism, framing rate reductions as corrections for technology-driven windfalls rather than wage cuts.
Components
- Establish Historical Earnings Baseline
- Measure Productivity Increase
- Calculate Rate Adjustment
- Present Comparison Tables
Prerequisites
- Historical earnings records by position
- Accurate productivity measurement capability
- Willingness to show workers the underlying data
Success Indicators
- Workers can verify earnings projections independently
- Rate changes are accepted without prolonged negotiation
- Actual post-change earnings match projections
Failure Modes
- Productivity gains prove temporary and rates become too low
- Workers perceive historical baseline as cherry-picked
- New technology reduces quality or increases effort in ways not captured by output metrics
Distributed Wage Negotiation Process
Coordinating demands across decentralized units while maintaining local flexibility
The Amalgamated Association's process for setting wage demands combined local input with central coordination. Local lodges discussed desired changes February-March, sent proposals to headquarters, which printed them in pamphlets distributed to all sub-lodges. Delegates then voted at a national convention. This balanced local knowledge with collective bargaining power.
Components
- Local Input Gathering
- Central Compilation
- Delegate Review
- Convention Deliberation
- Seriatim Voting
Prerequisites
- Defined local units with autonomous input authority
- Central office with compilation capacity
- Regular meeting cadence (annual minimum)
Success Indicators
- High local participation rates in input phase
- Delegates arrive prepared
- Clear differentiation between scales
- Decisions made seriatim not bundled
Failure Modes
- Locals skip input phase
- Central office delays distribution
- Convention rubber-stamps without debate
- Scales bundled to hide controversial items
Transparency-Based Arbitration Design
Making binding arbitration work through mandated information disclosure
A four-step framework for designing arbitration systems that overcome information asymmetry by requiring full disclosure of ground-truth data to a neutral third party before binding decisions are made. Developed from Weihe's testimony about why workers distrust arbitration when employers control profit information.
Components
- Define Ground Truth
- Mandate Disclosure
- Specify Enforcement
- Precommit to Binding Result
Prerequisites
- Willingness to disclose sensitive data
- Access to neutral arbitrator both sides trust
- Legal authority to create binding agreements
Success Indicators
- Both parties comply with disclosure without litigation
- Arbitrator renders decision without requesting additional data
- Decision is implemented without appeal
Failure Modes
- One party refuses disclosure and system collapses
- Arbitrator is captured by one side
- Ground truth is defined so narrowly it doesn't resolve the real dispute
- Enforcement mechanism is toothless and ignored
Centralized Enforcement Through Inspection Authority
Building organizational accountability through inspection rights and bonding
A five-step organizational design framework extracted from the Amalgamated Association constitution that creates compliance through centralized inspection authority, mandatory transparency, enforcement powers, financial bonding, and full-time focus. Prevents local deviation from central policy.
Components
- Grant Inspection Authority
- Mandate Transparency
- Specify Enforcement Powers
- Require Financial Bonding
- Make Role Full-Time
Prerequisites
- Authority to modify organizational bylaws
- Budget for full-time enforcement role
- Ability to secure performance bonds
- Willingness to enforce against powerful local units
Success Indicators
- Local units comply with inspection requests without resistance
- Central authority uses enforcement powers consistently
- Bonds are rarely forfeited because compliance is high
- No major governance scandals involving central authority
Failure Modes
- Central authority becomes corrupt and abuses inspection powers
- Local units successfully resist inspections through political pressure
- Bonding requirements are watered down until meaningless
- Enforcement is selective and perceived as arbitrary
- Full-time requirement leads to insularity and groupthink
Closed-Door Wage Negotiation Protocol
Isolating critical decisions from external pressure
A structured process for conducting high-stakes negotiations in executive session, excluding observers and limiting participation to decision-makers only. The framework creates informational and psychological isolation that protects negotiators from grandstanding, audience costs, and premature leaks.
Components
- Declare Executive Session
- Sequence Critical Business First
- Limit Information Outflow
- Document Final Agreement Only
Prerequisites
- Authority to exclude observers
- Participant buy-in on confidentiality
- Clear communication plan for post-session disclosure
Success Indicators
- Deals reached that would have been politically impossible in public
- Absence of leaks during negotiation
- Participants willing to return to closed format in future
Failure Modes
- Leaks undermine trust and credibility
- Public perceives secrecy as conspiracy
- Legal requirements force public disclosure
Strike Authorization Escalation Ladder
Multi-stage process to filter frivolous strikes
A hierarchical approval system requiring multiple committees and a two-week benefit delay before workers can receive strike support. Each stage filters out less serious grievances and forces commitment signaling.
Components
- Mill Committee Investigation
- Vice-President Examination
- Executive Committee Authorization
- Two-Week Benefit Delay
Prerequisites
- Distributed committee structure
- Strike fund with sufficient reserves
- Location tracking mechanism
- Member discipline to respect process
Success Indicators
- Strikes that occur are sustained through resolution
- Frivolous grievances resolved at lower levels
- Strike fund remains solvent
Failure Modes
- Workers bypass process via wildcat strikes
- Committees become rubber stamps
- Benefit fraud depletes fund
Pre-emptive Strike Prevention via Intelligence Infiltration
Identify and neutralize organizing efforts before they reach critical mass
Framework for embedding agents within target organizations to identify emerging leadership, understand organizing plans, and enable early intervention before coordinated action becomes possible. Core principle: neutralize threat at planning stage when it is weakest and least visible.
Components
- Embed Intelligence Agents
- Identify Ringleaders
- Inform Employer Early
- Deal Promptly with Ringleaders
Prerequisites
- Agents with plausible background
- Secure communication channel
- Authority to act on intelligence
Success Indicators
- Organizing efforts collapse before public action
- No martyrdom narrative emerges
- Future organizing attempts deterred
Failure Modes
- Agent identity revealed creating backlash
- Over-reaction to weak signals
- Legal violations in intelligence gathering
Financial Persuasion Before Coercion Protocol
Pay competitors to leave before resorting to force or confrontation
Framework for resolving competitive recruitment situations by offering financial inducement to those taking your positions to voluntarily depart. Core principle: economic incentive cheaper and less risky than confrontation, avoids creating hostile adversaries, preserves option to hire them later.
Components
- Calculate Cost of Confrontation
- Make Immediate Contact
- Offer Wage Plus Premium to Leave
- Send Them Away Peacefully
Prerequisites
- Liquid capital available
- Authority to make offers
- People who can make non-threatening contact
Success Indicators
- Replacements leave without incident
- No violence or arrests
- Employer has difficulty finding new replacements
Failure Modes
- Offer seen as coercion triggering legal response
- Creating precedent that invites future exploitation
- Insufficiently generous offer rejected
Mental Models (7)
Opportunity Cost
EconomicsThe value of the next-best alternative foregone when making a choice. Carnegie's sliding-scale minimum represented management's opportunity cost calculation: at what price point does paying the minimum wage cost less than the alternative of frequent strikes and production disruptions.
In Practice: The sliding-scale design revealed Carnegie's opportunity cost thinking: the minimum was set at the point where strike risk exceeded wage-floor cost
Demonstrated by Leg-ac-001
First-Mover Disadvantage
Strategic ThinkingIn negotiations, the party that makes the first offer or concession often signals their true reserva
In Practice: Carnegie tried to initiate negotiations in January but faced union delay until March. The union then
Demonstrated by Leg-ac-001
Windows of Opportunity
TimeTemporary periods when conditions favor action, bounded by events or circumstanc
In Practice: The contract termination date change was framed as administrative but had strate
Demonstrated by Leg-ac-001
Framing Effect
PsychologyHow information is presented shapes perception independent of content.
In Practice: Carnegie presented tonnage rate reductions alongside productivity data
Demonstrated by Leg-ac-001
Precommitment Device
Decision MakingA mechanism that constrains future choices to overcome time-inconsistency problems or strengthen negotiating positions. The published-price clause in the sliding-scale contract was a precommitment device: both parties agreed to be bound by external price determinations, removing their ability to negotiate over the base number.
In Practice: The American Manufacturer price clause functioned as a precommitment: both parties surrendered discretion over price determination to a third party, which reduced negotiation friction
Demonstrated by Leg-ac-001
Commitment Device
EconomicsA mechanism that imposes costs on backing out of a decision, filtering weak preferences and signaling true intent. The two-week strike benefit delay is a commitment device: workers who strike knowing they will receive no support for 14 days reveal genuine grievance, not opportunistic exit.
In Practice: Strike benefit delay structure forces costly commitment signal
Demonstrated by Leg-ac-001
Confirmation Bias
PsychologyThe tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of existing beliefs.
In Practice: Both Pinkerton and workers selectively present facts supporting their positions
Demonstrated by Leg-ac-001
Connective Tissue (6)
Use of published market prices from the American Manufacturer as neutral arbitrator of wage disputes parallels the use of published credit ratings from agencies like Moody's and S&P to determine bond covenants and pricing in modern debt markets. Both mechanisms outsource a contentious determination to a third-party publication to reduce negotiation friction and create verifiability.
The 1889 Carnegie-Amalgamated contract specified that billet prices would be determined by weekly quotations in the American Manufacturer publication. This removed subjectivity from the single most contentious input to the sliding-scale wage calculation. The modern equivalent is the use of published indices (LIBOR, CPI, commodities prices) or third-party ratings (credit ratings, property appraisals) to trigger contract terms. The mechanism is the same: both parties agree ex-ante to a neutral third party's determination, trading some control for reduced friction and increased credibility. The key insight: when parties cannot agree on a number, they can agree on who will determine the number.
While explaining the sliding-scale contract mechanism, Frick noted the American Manufacturer provision. The parallel to modern indexed contracts became clear: both mechanisms solve the problem of negotiating over numbers by outsourcing the determination to a credible third party.
Venetian Arsenal's process decomposition: galley construction split into sequential specialized stations where hull moved past craftsmen, each performing one task
Carnegie's slabbing mill decomposed ingot-to-plate production the same way the Venetian Arsenal decomposed galley construction 400 years earlier. Both systems solved the skilled labor bottleneck by splitting complex work into simple sequential tasks, enabling output to double without proportional wage increases. The Arsenal moved hulls past stationary craftsmen; Carnegie moved ingots through specialized mills. Both faced worker resistance to productivity-adjusted compensation.
Frick's testimony describing how introducing the slabbing mill doubled plate mill output without doubling wages, despite workers doing 'half the work'
Roman road network as distribution advantage: straight routes enabling rapid troop movement and commercial transport controlled by those who built and maintained them
Carnegie's decision to transport Pinkertons via river rather than rail parallels Roman strategy of using roads to bypass local resistance. Both recognized that controlling the transport route conferred tactical advantage. Romans built roads to avoid hostile territory; Carnegie used the river to avoid streets controlled by strikers. Geography as strategic weapon: the side that controls the approach route controls the confrontation's terms.
Frick and Rodgers testimony explaining why Pinkertons came by river: to avoid streets and land directly on company property without 'interfering with anybody'
Capital concentration as gravitational force in economics paralleling mass concentration in astrophysics
The Amalgamated Association preamble describes wealth concentration as an accelerating force: 'Year after year the capital of the country becomes more and more concentrated in the hands of the few; and, in proportion as the wealth of the country becomes centralized, its power increases.' This parallels gravitational physics where mass concentration creates gravitational wells that attract more mass, accelerating the concentration process. Just as gravitational collapse can only be countered by opposing forces (nuclear fusion in stars, centrifugal force in orbits), capital concentration can only be countered by organized collective action that aggregates the bargaining power of many small actors into a single countervailing force. The physics analogy illuminates why individual workers cannot resist concentrated capital any more than individual atoms can resist a gravitational field, but also why organized labor must maintain internal cohesion (like stellar fusion pressure) to prevent collapse.
Extracting principles from union constitution preamble about wealth concentration dynamics
Medieval guild apprenticeship systems that banned teaching trade secrets to outsiders, maintaining artificial scarcity of skilled labor through knowledge monopoly
The Amalgamated Association's prohibition on teaching unskilled workers (Article XVIII, Section 24) mirrors medieval guild restrictions on knowledge transfer. European craft guilds from 12th-16th centuries banned members from training non-guild workers, enforced multi-year apprenticeships, and expelled members who violated knowledge monopolies. Both systems recognize that skill scarcity is the source of labor bargaining power, and that knowledge diffusion erodes wage premiums. The guild model collapsed when industrial processes decomposed skilled trades into simple tasks, exactly as Carnegie was doing with the slabbing mill and open-hearth process, replacing craft knowledge with machine-enabled productivity.
Constitutional ban on teaching trade skills to outsiders reveals knowledge monopoly as wage defense
Scale effects that transform legal practice into harmful system requiring regulation, like compounding in physics or biology where small effects accumulate into phase transitions
Chairman's observation that while private companies may legally employ guards, extending the practice to thousands would result in evil requiring regulation parallels phase transition phenomena in physics and biology. Small-scale phenomena that are stable or harmless can undergo qualitative transformation when scaled beyond critical thresholds. Water molecules stable individually but exhibit turbulence at scale. Cell division healthy in development but becomes cancer when regulation fails. Private security legal for individual but becomes private army threatening state monopoly on force when scaled. The parallel: both natural and social systems have scale-dependent properties where quantity changes quality, and what works at small scale can be catastrophic at large scale.
Chairman explaining that legal small-scale practice can become evil if extended to large scale
Key Figures (11)
T. V. Powderly
91 mentionsGeneral Master Workman, Knights of Labor
William Weihe
15 mentionsPresident, Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers
H. C. Frick
15 mentionsChairman, Carnegie Steel Company
William A. Pinkerton
8 mentionsCo-owner, Pinkerton National Detective Agency
Andrew Carnegie
8 mentionsPrincipal partner, Carnegie Steel Company
William H. McCleary
8 mentionsSheriff of Allegheny County
George F. Rylands
3 mentionsWorker in 119-inch plate mill
Robert A. Pinkerton
3 mentionsFounder, Pinkerton National Detective Agency
Henry Ford
2 mentionsFounder, Ford Motor Company
J. A. Potter
1 mentionsSuperintendent, Homestead Steel Works
Henry Phipps Jr.
1 mentionsPartner, Carnegie Steel Company
Glossary (3)
subornation
DOMAIN_JARGONInducing someone to commit perjury or other unlawful act
“If subornation of perjury is not contained in that section, then it comes amazingly close to it”
blacksheep
DOMAIN_JARGONWorker who violates union solidarity rules, similar to scab or strikebreaker
“Any man holding two or more separate jobs shall be stigmatized as a blacksheep.”
billets
DOMAIN_JARGONSemi-finished steel product, square or round cross-section, used for re-rolling into bars, rods, wire
“The sliding scale was based on billets at $26.50 per ton.”
Key People (4)
William C. Oates
(1835–1910)U.S. Representative from Alabama, Chairman of House Committee
Henry Phipps Jr.
(1839–1930)Partner in Carnegie Steel Company
Henry Ford
(1863–1947)Founder of Ford Motor Company
J. A. Potter
Superintendent of Carnegie Homestead Steel Works in 1892
Concepts (6)
vertical integration
CL_STRATEGYOwnership of supply chain from raw materials to finished product, reducing dependence on external suppliers
limited partnership
CL_LEGALBusiness structure with general partners and limited partners with liability capped at investment
sliding scale (wages)
CL_ECONOMICSCompensation system where wages automatically adjust based on product market prices
binding arbitration
CL_LEGALDispute resolution where neutral third party decision is final and enforceable, removing courts or further negotiation
tonnage rate
CL_ECONOMICSPiece-rate compensation based on weight of output produced, common in steel and mining
third-party price reference
CL_FINANCIALContract clause tying payments to external published prices, removing negotiation
Synthesis
Synthesis
Migrated from Scholia