Annotations (9)
“TaylorMade and competitors shortened product cycles dramatically in declining market. New products came out way too frequently, basically repainting and putting different names on clubs. Result: flooded the market with first product, had to discount it before the next one arrived. Margins took big hit. Consumers learned to wait four months for 50% discount. What should be high 40s gross margin business dropped to low-mid 30s from heavy discounting. Virtuous circle going the wrong way.”— David Shapiro
p. 6
Business & Entrepreneurship · Strategy & Decision Making · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Shortened product cycles trained customers to wait for discounts
“Marketing spend evolution: TaylorMade had 400+ athletes under contract focused on driver count (how many drivers in play at tournaments). Wasn't moving the needle. KPS and management flipped approach: reduced absolute spend but concentrated on athletes who actually move the needle. Focused on social media following instead of biggest name or TV draw. Identified who has biggest Instagram/Facebook audience and drove content through them directly to consumers.”— David Shapiro
p. 16
Business & Entrepreneurship · Strategy & Decision Making · Operations & Execution
DUR_CONTEXTUAL
Fewer, better-targeted endorsements beat spray-and-pray
“TaylorMade went from over $1 billion in sales and $100M+ EBITDA to below $600M sales and $200M EBITDA loss in worst year (2015). Many looked at that and said not fixable. KPS focused on: why did revenue drop, what did they do to offset it, and did their infrastructure lag reality by a couple years? Often companies are still built for $1B+ revenue business but now doing $600M, carrying same overhead and fixed costs.”— David Shapiro
p. 7
Business & Entrepreneurship · Operations & Execution · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Cost structure lags revenue reality by two years
“The big issue was the product cycle. David Abeles had worked at TaylorMade earlier, was brought back in 2015 to rethink and sell the business. He wasn't burdened with justifying bad decisions from his watch. He was marketing-oriented, KPS was cost-structure oriented. That combination was very good: he tempered KPS instincts to reduce expenditures, KPS tempered his instincts to make significant expenditures. Insight: quality of information flow matters.”— David Shapiro
p. 8
Leadership & Management · Operations & Execution · Strategy & Decision Making
DUR_ENDURING
Complementary biases create balanced decision making
“KPS started with restructuring advisory in 1991, then in 1997 realized capital was missing in troubled manufacturing. Wherever there's a lack of capital, there's probably going to be an opportunity. Strategy: invest in troubled manufacturing, focus on controllable costs, don't count on revenue growth or market bailout. As they became more sophisticated, they expanded from strict cost focus to strategic thinking.”— David Shapiro
p. 3
Strategy & Decision Making · Business & Entrepreneurship · Operations & Execution
DUR_ENDURING
Market inefficiency creates opportunity where capital is absent
“Pricing breakthrough: commercial side had been stagnant for years. Real fear of breaking certain thresholds (driver at $399, belief that you cannot get people to pay more). KPS pushed hard: you've been held at that price for five years, adding technology and great stories, but selling at same price. How do you know how elastic the market is? During KPS ownership, top driver went from under $500 to over $600. That's all margin.”— David Shapiro
p. 17
Business & Entrepreneurship · Economics & Markets · Psychology & Behavior
DUR_ENDURING
Untested pricing assumptions leave margin on table
“KPS commissioned surveys to understand golf equipment buying. One finding: out of 10 attributes, nobody admits they care which pros play those clubs. Almost universally ranked 10th. But it really does move the needle. People buy clubs because Rory McIlroy plays them even though that seems ridiculous. This was tricky for KPS to value: how do you quantify those sponsorships and relationships? How important is it? How many do you need?”— David Shapiro
p. 8
Psychology & Behavior · Business & Entrepreneurship
DUR_ENDURING
People deny caring about expert endorsement but act on it
“Exit timing philosophy: we try hard not to fall in love with our companies. We become very attached to businesses and people, but we know what our job is: get returns back to investors at the right time, and sooner is better. By 2021, TaylorMade had three really strong years, company and brand in great shape, products coming were really good. View: let's not try to hold onto this too long. We've got a huge success here and there should be real interest. Why don't we take it out?”— David Shapiro
p. 19
Strategy & Decision Making · Business & Entrepreneurship
DUR_ENDURING
Sell into strength while optionality remains
“Product cycle fix: elongate timing and enforce discipline to ensure each new product has a real story around meaningful difference. TaylorMade guys were awesome storytellers; KPS didn't touch the digital content and media work because it wasn't an area where they would add value. Key tension: having discipline to wait for truly differentiated product versus pressure to keep releasing.”— David Shapiro
p. 15
Business & Entrepreneurship · Operations & Execution · Leadership & Management
DUR_ENDURING
Fixed product cycle by extending timeline
Frameworks (2)
Capital Inefficiency Strategy
Four-Stage Evolution from Advisory to Value-Add Investing
KPS evolved from restructuring advisory to private equity by identifying capital gaps in troubled manufacturing. Strategy: focus on controllable costs, don't count on revenue growth or market bailout. Evolution occurred when they realized they were doing the hard turnaround work but selling to buyers who did the strategic value-add work. Decision: marry cost discipline with strategic growth to capture full value creation.
Components
- Identify Market Inefficiency
- Focus on Controllable Variables
- Observe Value Creation Beyond Your Work
- Integrate Cost Discipline with Strategic Growth
Prerequisites
- Experience in operational turnarounds
- Pattern recognition across deals
- Willingness to hold assets longer than pure cost-cutting requires
Success Indicators
- Expanding from pure cost focus to strategic positioning
- Capturing value that used to go to subsequent buyers
- Maintaining operational discipline while pursuing growth
Failure Modes
- Losing cost discipline when pursuing growth
- Exiting too early in turnaround cycle
- Failing to develop strategic capabilities beyond cost-cutting
Turnaround Diagnostic Framework
Three Questions for Evaluating Distressed Manufacturing Businesses
When evaluating a business that has lost significant revenue quickly, ask three diagnostic questions: (1) Why did revenue decline? (2) What did management do to offset or fix it? (3) Did infrastructure lag reality? Often troubled businesses are still built for prior scale, carrying overhead and fixed costs two years out of date. For asset-light businesses, focus on what normalized cash flow looks like when you stop bad behavior, right-size cost structure, and benefit from carving out from a parent with mismatched competencies.
Components
- Diagnose Revenue Decline
- Evaluate Management Response
- Model Normalized Cash Flow
Prerequisites
- Understanding of industry cost structures
- Access to detailed financials
- Ability to model normalized operations
Success Indicators
- Clear identification of self-inflicted wounds vs. market issues
- Quantification of infrastructure lag
- Credible normalized cash flow projection
Failure Modes
- Underestimating difficulty of behavior change
- Overestimating benefit of parent separation
- Missing hidden costs that emerge post-acquisition
Mental Models (11)
Market Inefficiency Arbitrage
EconomicsWherever capital is absent or inefficiently deployed, opportunity exists for those willing to provide it at appropriate risk-adjusted returns.
In Practice: KPS identified that no equity investors wanted to play in troubled manufacturing in the 1990s, creating opportunity
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Negative Feedback Loops
Systems ThinkingSelf-reinforcing cycles where each iteration makes the problem worse. Product cy
In Practice: TaylorMade's product cycle death spiral where each new launch required deeper di
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Price Anchoring
EconomicsOnce customers learn a reference price through discounting, they resist paying full price and wait for sales.
In Practice: Golf customers learned to wait 4 months for 50% discounts, destroying margin
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Infrastructure Lag
EconomicsCost structures typically lag revenue changes by 2+ years, especially in declining businesses. Organizations built for prior scale carry excess overhead.
In Practice: TaylorMade still built for $1B+ revenue business while doing $600M
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Stated vs. Revealed Preferences
PsychologyWhat people say they care about often differs from what actually drives behavior.
In Practice: Golfers claimed pro endorsements were least important factor but behavior showed they were critical
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Information Flow Quality
Systems ThinkingDecision quality depends on information flowing between the right nodes at the r
In Practice: TaylorMade ordered 10M drivers based on launch optimism rather than real market
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Concentration Strategy
EconomicsReducing total spend while concentrating it on highest-ROI targets can increase absolute returns.
In Practice: TaylorMade cut marketing from 20% to 11% of revenue while improving effectiveness by focusing on social media following
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Force Multipliers
Strategic ThinkingIdentify resources that amplify impact per dollar spent. Social media followers became force multipl
In Practice: Athletes with large social followings multiplied impact of endorsement dollars
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Fear-Based Constraints
PsychologyUntested assumptions about market limits create self-imposed constraints.
In Practice: TaylorMade feared $399 price ceiling for drivers; testing revealed market accepted $600+
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Exit Timing Discipline
Decision MakingAvoid falling in love with assets. Sell into strength when you have optionality and while value is high, even if you could hold longer.
In Practice: KPS sold TaylorMade after three strong years rather than trying to hold for peak
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Sooner is Better
TimeIn investment management, earlier realization of returns compounds longer for in
In Practice: KPS philosophy: get returns back to investors at right time, and sooner is bette
Demonstrated by Leg-ds-001
Key Figures (3)
David Abeles
3 mentionsCEO, TaylorMade (2015-2021)
Former TaylorMade executive brought back by Adidas in 2015 to rethink the business.
- Wasn't burdened with justifying bad decisions from prior management
Rory McIlroy
2 mentionsProfessional Golfer
Rickie Fowler
1 mentionsProfessional Golfer
Key People (1)
Rory McIlroy
(1989–)Northern Irish professional golfer, four-time major champion
Concepts (2)
EBITDA
CL_FINANCIALEarnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization; proxy for operating cash flow
Price Elasticity
CL_ECONOMICSMeasure of how demand changes when price changes; inelastic products can bear price increases
Synthesis
Synthesis
Migrated from Scholia